Hypnotic responding might be due to attenuated frontal lobe functioning after the hypnotic induction. Little is known about whether personality traits linked with frontal functioning are associated with responsiveness to hypnotic suggestions. We assessed whether hypnotic suggestibility is related to the traits of self-control and impulsivity in 154 participants who completed the Brief Self-Control Scale, the Self-Regulation Scale, the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale , and the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility . BIS-11 non-planning impulsivity correlated positively with HGSHS:A . Furthermore, (...) in the best model emerging from a stepwise multiple regression, both non-planning impulsivity and self-control positively predicted hypnotic suggestibility, and there was an interaction of BIS-11 motor impulsivity with gender. For men only, motor impulsivity tended to predict hypnotic suggestibility. Hypnotic suggestibility is associated with personality traits linked with frontal functioning, and hypnotic responding in men and women might differ. (shrink)

This collection of essays arose directly from a series of seminars conducted at the Institute of Classical Studies of London University during 1967-1968. Most of the material is published for the first time. Articles by Sandbach and Kidd offer arguments concerning kataleptike phantasia as the test of a true presentation, and Posidonius' conception of the role of the emotions in relation to his scientifically based ethical theory. In addition to the positions held by Rist, Sandbach and Kidd, A. C. Lloyd (...) argues that the Stoic categories, as lekta, should be classified under dialectic and grammar rather than physics. S. G. Pembroke argues most cogently for the central importance of the difficult and controversial concept of oikeiosis in Stoicism. In two essays, editor Long, slanting the conclusion of his discussion of lekta towards its ethical implications, argues first that there is no evidence to show that lekta persist outside of acts of thought and communication distinct from the speaker and his reference; and secondly, that "man," because his logos is equal in quality to all the divine which is outside of it, and because it constitutes a unique substance whose identity is unaffected by external events, "can be free, can act as a man, if and only if the external movements of his body follow from a decision which reconciles his own will and moral choice to what is necessarily the case." Finally, in a not altogether satisfactory concluding essay, "The Natural Law and Stoicism," Gerald Watson discusses among other things some of the practical applications of natural law and its later influence posterior to the Stoic use of it. Although the editor does not attempt either to unify the varying positions presented or to present a comprehensive view of Stoicism, he does bring together some stimulating arguments concerning particular problems in Stoic ethics, metaphysics, epistemology and psychology. This book, truly a statement of "work in progress," is sure to arouse further discussion of the important topics discussed within its carefully documented pages.--T. V. U. (shrink)

A collection of the scripta minora of Harold Cherniss edited by L. Taran to honor Cherniss on the occasion of his seventieth birthday and on his retirement as a fellow of the Institute for Advanced Study. Although all the papers presented here except one have been published previously, the works of Cherniss presented in this volume are worthy of recollection.

Nonlocal reaction–diffusion equations describe various biological and biomedical applications. Their mathematical properties are essentially different in comparison with the local equations, and this difference can lead to important biological implications. This review will present the state of the art in the investigation of nonlocal reaction–diffusion models in biomedical applications. We will consider various models arising in mathematical immunology, neuroscience, cancer modelling, and we will discuss their mathematical properties, nonlinear dynamics, resulting spatiotemporal patterns and biological significance.

The conception on which the affirmative philosophy of G.G. Shpet rests can be called hermeneutic phenomenology. The choice of this term demands explanation. Shpet's basic hermeneutic work, Hermeneutics and Its Problems [Germenevtika i ee problemy], was completed in 1918. At the time hermeneutics was understood usually as the art of grasping the meaning of a text. It is worth noting that this art was quite specific. It consisted mostly of a set of psychological techniques for "penetrating" into the internal world (...) of the text's author. The techniques were empathy, sympathy, immersion in a historico-cultural world, and imaginative penetration into the author's creative "workshop." Understood in this way, hermeneutics was a psychologically loaded research method. And if it is treated only in that way, the recently coined term "hermeneutic phenomenology" is in respect to content internally contradictory. As I see it, Shpet fully realized what conclusions could follow from this. Nevertheless his fundamental aspirations are connected precisely with the idea of unifying hermeneutics and phenomenology. This is possible because words have a complex structure . The sense of a word is objective and can be known by nonpsychological methods. The art of comprehending the sense of a text must inevitably include semiotic methods as well as logical and phenomenological techniques. They are aimed at comprehending (studying, researching, but not "grasping" or "sympathizing with" the objective, internal sense of the text. All the other elements of the sensible structure of the text are overlaid with the psychological peculiarities of the author and historical and social conditions. They are external factors that influence the sense of the text in a distinctive way and, without question, must be taken into account and included in the investigation of texts under the general heading "conditions of understanding," which are comprehended by the historical method. The psychological and historical methods in hermeneutics were historically conditioned research techniques, scientific means of comprehending sense under conditions when semiotic means were not yet developed, contemporary logico-semantic techniques were not available, and the phenomenological method was not yet invented. For this reason hermeneutics is reducible conceptually to a mere psychological art: it was only forced into being this by the lack of technical instrumentation. Moreover, the psychological hermeneutics of the nineteenth century may be called without any exaggeration the historical variant of hermeneutics in general. (shrink)

Сборник издан к 60-летию доктора филологических наук, профессора Тверского государственного университета Михаила Викторовича Строганова. Авторы и составители построили его как праздничное торжество: здесь есть и серьезные научные чтения.

Coming fromI andCl, i.e. from intuitionistic and classical propositional calculi with the substitution rule postulated, and using the sign to add a new connective there have been considered here: Grzegorozyk's logicGrz, the proof logicG and the proof-intuitionistic logicI set up correspondingly by the calculiFor any calculus we denote by the set of all formulae of the calculus and by the lattice of all logics that are the extensions of the logic of the calculus, i.e. sets of formulae containing the axioms (...) of and closed with respect to its rules of inference. In the logiclG the sign is decoded as follows: A = (A & A). The result of placing in the formulaA before each of its subformula is denoted byTrA. The maps are defined (in the definitions of x and the decoding of is meant), by virtue of which the diagram is constructed. (shrink)

A remarkable phenomenon in our present-day culture has been the broad interest shown in the history of Russian thought, which is continually, and sometimes even from unexpected quarters, showing itself to be of topical interest. Recently, and particularly in connection with the publication of the works of N. F. Fedorov, there has been an exchange of opinions in the pages of various journals with regard to the essence of his philosophical views, revealing not merely conflicting, but in a number of (...) cases mutually exclusive assessments of those views. (shrink)

What is philosophy and what are its distinctive features? What is its relationship to the sciences whose business it is to study the actual world? With what should philosophy concern itself?-These are the fundamental questions dealt with in the article by Alfred Ayer. These questions are important and interesting. The article is written in lively fashion and stimulates a desire to discuss these subjects. There are some matters on which we do not disagree with Ayer, but concur. At the same (...) time we would like to express some objections to certain of his basic positions. (shrink)

Modern physics is developing with extraordinary rapidity. It is passing through a tremendous revolution. The boldest and most fantastic imaginings, which only yesterday appeared virtually unrealizable, are being brought to reality in the course of this revolution.

I found Shpet's article "A Work on Philosophy" [Rabota po filosofii], which we present to the reader's attention, in the Shpet archives stored in the Lenin State Library and passed it on to the editorial board of the journal Logos, where it was published by I. Chubarov. The small circulation of that journal makes it appropriate to republish this text, which is of major importance for an understanding of Shpet's philosophical position and provides a good clarification of the subsequent logic (...) of development of his conception. Although the article is unfinished, there is no reason to lament this fact, since all of its basic ideas and their logical development were realized by Shpet in subsequent publications. A whole series of his works is devoted to grounding and affirming so-called positive philosophy, the basic features of which I would like to clarify. (shrink)

Knowledge is systemic by its nature. The highest expression of the systematic character of knowledge is to be found in scientific theories. Any scientific theory is a rigorously organized conceptual system, quite complex in structure. What defines the manner in which knowledge is organized in a theory? Is it independent of the nature and structural features of that sphere of the material world for cognition of which the theory was created, or is it conditioned by these features and does it (...) derive from them? Is there a correspondence between the structure of knowledge concentrated in a theory and the structure of that fragment of material reality that is modeled by that theory? Is it possible at all for a theory to be a form of reflection of objective reality, if there is no definite correspondence between its structure and the structure of the region of reality to which it pertains? These questions are of primary importance to the treatment of the theory of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Книга рассчитана на студентов, аспирантов, преподавателей высших и средних учебных заведений, всех интересующихся данными исследованиями.

The articles examines the teleofunctional solution to the problem of mental causation, presented by Dmitry Volkov in his recently published book Free Will. An Illusion or an Opportunity. D.B. Volkov proposes solutions to three big metaphysical problems – mental causation, personal identity, and free will. Solving the first problem, Volkov creatively combines the advantages of Dennett’s teleofunctional model and Vasilyev’s local interactionism. Volkov’s teleofunctional model of mental causation seeks to prove the causal relevance of mental properties as non-local higher order (...) properties. In my view, its substantiation is based on three points: (a) critics of the exclusion problem and Kim’s model of mental causation, (b) “Library of first editions” argument, (c) reduction of the causal trajectories argument (CTA 1) by Vasilyev to the counterpart argument (CTA 2) by Volkov. Each of these points faces objections. Kim’s criticism is based on an implicit confusion of two types of reduction – reduction from supervenience and from multiple realizability. The latter type does not threaten Kim’s ideas, but Volkov uses this very type in his criticism. The “Library of first editions” argument does not achieve its goal due to compositional features and because non-local relational properties are a type of external properties that cannot be causally relevant. The reduction of CTA 1 to CTA 2 is unsuccessful since, in the case of this reduction, important features of CTA 1 are lost – these are local mental properties, due to which the influence of non-local physical factors occurs. My main objection is that the concept of causally relevant non-local properties is incompatible with the very concept of cause. The set of causally relevant properties of cause can only be local. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the analysis of arguments from empirical science against free will. Its main purpose is to reveal their deep anti-naturalism. This anti-naturalism lies in the use of a concept of free will that cannot be the subject of naturalistic consideration, as well as in the various explanatory and ontological paradoxes that arguments from empirical science lead in case when someone is trying to generalize the explanatory principles underlying them. At the beginning of the article, the author (...) gives a general notion of the free will problem, a working definition of naturalism and the place of arguments from empirical science in discussions about free will. To achieve the main goal of the article, the author suggests a classification of arguments from empirical science, which includes five types: from prediction, from manipulation, from the brain, from illusion, from the substitution of concepts. In accordance with this classification, the structure of the article is defined, where each of the presented types is sequentially considered. The logic of considering each type of argument is approximately the same: explication of the essence of the argument of a particular type, its analysis, identification of basic principles and their generalization, demonstration of the negative consequences that it leads to, and answers to possible objections. In the course of the consideration, the author formulates an ontologically neutral concept of free will as a set of abilities associated with the agent’s control over his actions. At the end of the article, the main points is summed up, the idea of naturalistic compatibilism is proposed, the role of arguments from empirical science in discussions about free will is clarified, as is the problem of free will itself, the question of the sources of “chimerization” of naturalism is briefly highlighted, and the problem of completeness of the proposed reasoning is touched upon. (shrink)